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Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China’s listed
firms

1. Introduction
Executive pay dispersion, defined as the pay differential between the CEO and other
executives, has implications for the inner workings of the top executive team, and for overall
firm performance (Bebchuk et al., 2011). While many studies examine the level and structure
of executive compensation and its relationship with performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990;
Yermack 1996; Core et al. 1999; Murphy 1999), controversy remains about how executive
pay differentials arise and affect firm performance (Kale et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2011;
Chen et al., 2011a). Since the emergence of the global financial crisis, the media has been
critical of the large gap in pay between CEOs and employees in most countries, and of the
resulting severe agency problems and inequality. While many governments have tried to
reduce the gap by restricting ever-higher CEO compensation1, public anger and resentment of
it has not ceased.
The extant literature tends toward two views regarding the optimal (or appropriate) level
of pay dispersion. The tournament viewpoint sees the pay differential in the corporate
hierarchy as defining an arena where individuals compete for promotion and rewards. Highperforming executives with considerable managerial potential win promotion and
commensurate compensation. A large spread of compensation across corporate hierarchical
levels attracts talented and venturesome participants to compete in the managerial tournament
by providing extra incentives to exert effort. This viewpoint supports the view that a large
pay dispersion is necessary to provide appropriate incentives for executives to perform (Main
et al., 1993; Eriksson, 1999; Kale et al., 2009).2 The entrenchment viewpoint sees the large
pay gap between the CEO and other executives as giving an indication of CEO power
(Lambert et al., 1993), since powerful CEOs are entrenched and find it easier to expropriate
shareholder wealth. Empirical studies show that the excess executive-pay gap might reflect
1

These governments include the U.S., Germany, the U.K., France, Sweden, China and some others. Specifically, the U.S.
Department of the Treasury has announced a $500,000 cap on top-paid executives for the most distressed financial
institutions, and the German government places a €500,000 cap on top executives in banks in financial distress.
2
Empirical evidence is mixed on the tournament viewpoint. For example, O’Reilly et al. (1988) do not find support for the
tournament argument in a sample of 105 Fortune 500 firms, and Conyon et al. (2001) report that variation in executive
compensation is not associated with enhanced firm performance in a sample of 100 UK firms in 1997.
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agency problems and reduce firm value and performance (Adams et al., 2005; Landier et al.,
2008; Bebchuk et al., 2011).
Evidence from emerging markets such as China has only recently started to appear. Chen
et al. (2011a) document that managerial powers are positively related to executive
remuneration, and organizational levels and contestant numbers have positive effects on pay
differences between executives. They provide preliminary evidence that the pay gap has a
positive effect on firm performance, and that this effect is stronger in firms that are relatively
less controlled by the government. Lin and Lu (2009) also find that the pay gap is positively
related to firm performance, and that this relationship is more significant with higher
managerial power (defined as larger managerial ownership and longer tenure of the CEO).
Although the evidence for pay dispersion's positive effect on performance has been
established, there is no comprehensive analysis showing how it affects firm performance and
by what mechanism.
This paper extends the existing literature by examining the channels through which the
institutional features of emerging markets shape executive pay dispersion, and how they
affect tournament incentives in China’s listed firms. Specifically, it identifies the institutional
features that can affect pay dispersion and the relationship between pay dispersion and firm
performance, including state ownership, CEO political connections and reform of the splitshare structure. Moreover, in contrast to Lin and Lu (2009), this paper follows Bebchuk et al.
(2011) in treating managerial power as an entrenchment, and investigates its impact on the
association between pay dispersion and firm performance.
The institutional background of China’s listed firms encompasses several important
features that shape executive pay dispersion, and which may differ from those in the U.S. and
other countries. First, while CEO compensation has been increasingly important, and more
related to firm’s profits since China's economic reform of executive compensation (Groves et
al., 1994; Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006b; Zheng et al., 2008; Cao et al., 2011a), the
executive pay dispersion remains constrained by the dominance of state ownership and
government intervention. In addition to the goals of maximizing shareholders’ value, the state
owner (in other words, the government) also has non-economic goals of maintaining social
3

equality and harmony. Due to these non-economic goals, the pay differential in the corporate
hierarchy, especially in SOEs, would attract close political scrutiny because it is a potential
point of conflict. Furthermore, the competition for completion of these non-economic goals
does not necessarily lead to an improvement in performance (Jensen, 2001). Independent
from the incentives provided by executive compensation, performance improvement in SOEs
could be related to policy support obtained from the government. Secondly, an implicit
incentive scheme such as perquisites, political promotion, chasing personal fame and other
“grey” income on the position seems to be prevalent, but not directly observable, in China’s
emerging market (Chen et al., 2010b; Cao et al., 2011b). In such an economic environment,
which lacks a functioning external labour market, the complexity of executive incentive casts
doubts on the value of explicit monetary compensation. This study applies the notion of pay
dispersion to such market conditions to understand executive incentive.
In accordance with previous research (Kale et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2011), this
study measured CEO pay dispersion by i) the pay gap between the CEO and other top
executives (GAP), and ii) the ratio of CEO pay to the total compensation of the top five
executives within the top management team (CPS). It shows that the mean pay gap is
250,868RMB (equivalent to 36,891USD), which is much lower than the 778,000USD
reported by Kale et al. (2009), and the ratio of CEO pay to the aggregate compensation of the
top five executives across our sample in China is 31.9%, which is around 3.9% lower than the
figure found by Bebchuk et al., (2011) for U.S firms. Moreover, pay dispersion in privately
controlled firms is 30.1% larger than in SOEs, and the CPS is 6.5% higher. In private firms
where CEOs are politically connected, the pay gap is 20% higher and the CPS is 10% higher
than in those where the CEOS do not have such connections.
Our empirical analysis find that pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance,
which supports the tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), and that the positive effect
of CEO pay dispersion on firm performance is weaker in state-controlled firms and in firms
where CEOs are politically connected. We further found in a subsample of SOEs that
tournament incentives are weaker if firms seek for goals that are more political, such as the
remittance of tax imposed by governments; in a subsample of private firms, tournament
4

incentives become weaker if the CEO is also the owner who controls the firm. These findings
suggest that the multiple goals of SOEs and agency problems in private firms will reduce
tournament incentives. In addition, we found that a split-share structure reform strengthens
the positive relationship between CEO pay dispersion and firm performance, although this
amplification is weaker in SOEs and stronger in private firms. This was particularly so after
the reform where CEO pay dispersion began to have a significant effect on stock-market
performance when measured as stock return.
These results remained robust when the endogeneity of pay dispersion was taken into
consideration and alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance were applied.
When we controlled for granting stock options and perks, our results still supported the main
findings listed above. Overall, our findings suggest that institutional features such as state
ownership, political connections and market reform play an important role in tournament
incentives in China;

these incentives in turn mitigate the agency problems between

shareholders and managers because pay dispersion is appropriately aligned with the CEO’s
relative talents and contributions, and provide extra incentive to top executives.
Our study contributes to the literature on executive compensation by first focusing on
comparisons of the level of executive compensation (e.g., Kaplan, 1994; Abowd and Kaplan,
1999; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Kato and Long, 2005), and then by exploring the
institutional background in which executive pay dispersion arises, and examining its different
implications for firms in developed economies like the U.S.
Second, we extend the extant literature on the theory of executive incentive. Prior studies
have examined whether executive pay dispersion provides a tournament incentive (Lazear
and Rosen, 1981; Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2001; Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2006; Kale et al.,
2009; Bebchuk et al., 2011), but the evidence is mixed, because tournaments should depend
on their economic value and cultural environments (Burns et al., 2011). Some researchers
have found the executive pay gap to be positively associated with firm performance in
China’s firms (Lin and Lu, 2009; Chen et al., 2011a), indicating that Chinese cultural values
such as collectivism, and firm characteristics such as managerial power, have a substantial
effect on tournament incentives. In addition to examining the effect of ownership types on
5

executive pay dispersion, our study explores deeper reasons that shape tournament incentives
in different types of firms, and examines other institutional features in China such as political
connections and the influence of split-share structure reform in China.
Third, we contribute to the emerging debate on the pay gap between CEOs and other
employees since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, and whether the pay gap should be
regulated (Conyon et al., 2009; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2009; Core and Guay, 2010; Garner
and Kim, 2010). Questions about the appropriate level and structure of executive
compensation as an incentive mechanism for better firm performance still exist, as does the
question of whether tournament theory even holds as an explanation for the large CEO pay
gap found in the U.S. and elsewhere. The effect of pay restrictions imposed by regulators
might be traded off by limiting tournament incentives.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the background and
develops hypotheses; Section 3 provides a description of data and methodology; Section 4
discusses empirical results; Section 5 presents robustness tests; and Section 6 draws some
conclusions from the findings.

2. Background and hypothesis
2.1 Executive pay dispersion and firm performance in China
A performance-based contract links managerial compensation to firm performance; this can
tempt managers to manipulate the output level when performance is unobservable (Kale et al.,
2009). Rank-order tournaments solve this problem in that tournament commitments are set in
advance, which is why Lazear and Rosen (1981) proposed that setting a large pay gap can
mitigate agency problems when monitoring costs are too high. This large pay dispersion
between the CEO and other executives is regarded as a "prize" that provides executives with
incentives to compete, and in turn to increase firm performance. Some implications of the
effects of pay dispersion on firm performance have been discussed in previous studies. In
particular, Kale et al. (2009) find that the CEO pay gap exerts a positive effect on firm
performance (measured as return on assets and Tobin’s Q). It is argued that in China, the
corporate governance environment is less efficient, and outside stakeholders will focus on
6

internal monitoring mechanisms to set a larger pay dispersion and an efficient pay scheme.
Within a sample of Chinese listed firms, Chen et al. (2011a) document that pay dispersion is
positively related to earnings per share (EPS), while Lin and Lu (2009) find that the pay gap
is positively related to return on equity. Based on this discussion, we conjecture that a larger
pay dispersion will be optimal for creating an incentive, and provide the following hypothesis:
H1: The executive pay dispersion is positively associated with firm performance.

2.2 The executive incentive, pay dispersion and institutional environment in China
If CEO pay dispersion is an important source of tournament incentives for managers, then
the motivations that a tournament initiates, as well as its consequences, should be related not
only to firm characteristics (e.g., Kale et al., 2009), but also to the firm’s institutional
environment. Previous research has found that the ratio of CEO compensation to non-CEO
executive compensation varies significantly across firms, as well as across country and
cultural variables (Burns et al., 2012). This study examines whether several key institutional
features in China’s emerging markets influence the incentive provided by executive pay
dispersion.
2.2.1 SOEs' multiple objectives in China
After 1978, when the Chinese government began to transform the original planned
economy into a market-oriented economy, state-owned firms were corporatized and
privatized, and some were listed on either of the two stock exchanges in Shanghai and
Shenzhen. Even though these privatized or carved-out state owned enterprises (SOEs) were
transmitted to act as their counterparts in western countries, with investment and financing
decision-making decentralized from state to firm level, they inherited the responsibilities of
their predecessors by taking over a wide range of social and political goals in addition to just
maximizing shareholder value.
In general, a salient feature of state ownership is the existence of multiple objectives. As
SOEs are controlled by the government, their decisions are subject to the influence of the
government; thus, SOEs can be understood as agents of the government in the capital market.
Moreover, because these SOEs receive policy and financial support from the government,
7

they are also required to satisfy social objectives such as stable employment levels and social
stability, and political objectives such as controlling sensitive industries by creating
monopolies. Unlike a typical shareholder in market economies, the state shareholders in
China face the multiple challenges of increasing production and maintaining social stability.
In particular, multi-task theory has been offered to capture the trade-off between production
and social stability (Bai et al., 2000). Given these multiple objectives, the Chinese
government has imposed restrictions on the pay gap between executives and ordinary
workers since the 1980s (Chen et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2010). Meanwhile, SOEs have put
more emphasis on guaranteeing workers lifetime employment, paying for health care and
education for their children and honoring their commitment to a large number of retired
former employees, which in turn contributes to social stability (Bai et al., 2006). State
shareholders placing greater importance on the objective of maintaining social and political
stability, rather than improving economic performance (Chang and Wong, 2009), will tend to
reduce the effectiveness of executive incentives, including pay dispersion as a tournament
incentive to improve firm performance.
Alternative incentives also exist within SOEs. For example, gaining political promotion in
China’s giant government hierarchy may provide a stronger incentive for firm performance
(Cao et al., 2011b); perks are more likely to motivate managers to work for the interests of
shareholders in China (Chen et al., 2010; Adithipyangkul et al., 2011); top managers may
take advantage of their position or abuse managerial power for personal gain or fame, and to
circumvent any restrictions on pay, etc. Therefore, explicit compensation that interacts with
other incentives might be influenced significantly by the fact that the firm is controlled by the
state.
Therefore, we conjecture that executive pay dispersion would provide less tournament
incentive for improving firm performance in SOEs than in private firms because SOEs are
responsible for satisfying multiple economic and social goals imposed by governments. Thus
we suggest the following hypothesis:
H2: The positive association between pay dispersion and firm performance is weaker in
SOEs.
8

2.2.2 Political connections
Political connection is a common phenomenon across the world in publicly listed firms,
particularly those with a concentrated ownership structure and a weak corporate governance
system (Faccio, 2006; Chen et al., 2011b). Some evidence suggests that political connection
can bring benefits to companies by accessing the key resources controlled and allocated by
the government, including bank loans, favorable tax treatment, preferential corporate bailouts
and government subsidies (Faccio et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008). In this sense, executive
incentive is less aligned to firm performance because firms with political connections rely
less on their executives' performance to evaluate them. In addition, politically connected
CEOs are likely to entrench themselves by providing unique political capital; moreover, they
face a lower replacement probability and require higher compensation (Aslan and Grinstein,
2011; Cao et al., 2012).
On this basis we conjecture that pay dispersion in firms with political connections is
steeper; the higher compensation offered in firms with political connections may reflect rents
captured by the CEO, and thus they can be viewed as a product of agency (governance)
problems. Executives can win the tournament "prize" by connecting with governments rather
than exerting more effort, which will reduce tournament incentives as a means of improving
firm performance (Chen et al., 2011a).
In addition, previous studies have focused on the roles played by CEOs with political
connections in private firms (Li et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Cao et al., 2012). Researchers
have argued that private firms, rather than SOEs, are chosen as the sample for studying
political connections because at the time they were formed, SOEs naturally built connections
with the government, and it seems difficult to distinguish whether political capital in SOEs
comes from the nature of state ownership or the political connections of executives and
boards. However, private firms have their own objectives for maximizing market value, and
are not bearing the monitoring of government regulations, so the favorable treatment they
receive from government should be attributed to politically connected executives. Therefore,
a CEO’s political connection is expected to have a substantial effect in private firms. We
formulate our hypothesis as follows:
9

H3: The positive association between pay dispersion and firm performance is weaker in
firms where the CEO is politically connected, especially in private firms.

2.2.3 Market reforms
Evidence shows that market developments such as better investor protection, stronger
legal enforcement and greater market competition, leads to increasing equity financing and
firm value (La Porta et al., 1998, 2002). Then those shareholders who face more-intense
market competition will tend to offer steeper incentives and higher compensation, and thus
induce greater effort. For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) find a growing level of
executive compensation in the U.S. in the 1990s. Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Hubbard
and Palia (1995) argue that market competition requires executives to have more managerial
talent and take higher risks, and thus should receive higher compensation.
In a market economy, to ensure that executives are appropriately motivated and that their
talent is successfully acquired and retained, shareholders must provide higher compensation
in an explicit contract. Thus, along with the progress of market-oriented reforms in China, we
expect the dispersion of executive pay to grow and provide more incentive to improve firm
performance. For example, in April 2005, China’s capital market launched a split-share
structure reform aimed at converting non-tradable shares (typically held by the state and legal
persons) into tradable shares. This reform has induced the development of a more marketoriented compensation plan and increased market competition (Li et al., 2011). Hence, we
provide the following hypothesis:
H4: The positive association between pay dispersion and firm performance has become
stronger since the split-share structure reform was launched.

3. Data and model
3.1 The sample
Our empirical tests are based on all Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
stock exchanges between 2005 and 2010. Our sample year starts in 2005, when compensation
for individual executives (including CEO, CFO, Chairman, and other executives) began to be
10

disclosed in annual reports 3 . Before 2005, the listed firms only disclosed the aggregate
payment of the top three executives. We excluded firms flagged with ST and *ST from our
total population, as this denotes special treatment due to irregularity in financial reporting,
and negative profit for two or three consecutive years. We also excluded firms in the finance
industry because of their unique accounting standards, and firms with missing observations
on the main variables used in our analysis. Our final sample consists of 7,811 firm-year
observations. Executive compensation, corporate governance and financial data for the firms
were obtained from the firms' annual reports and the CSMAR database.
3.2 Variable definition
CEO pay dispersion
Following Kale et al. (2009) and Bebchuk et al. (2011), we adopted two primary
measurements for tournament incentives. The first measurement, GAP, is defined as the log
of difference between CEO pay and the median pay of all other executives in the top
management team (pay gap). Specifically:
GAP = Log (Total compensation of CEO − Median of total
compensation of other executives in the firm year )

The second measurement, CEO pay slice (CPS), is computed as the fraction of aggregate
compensation of the top five members of the executive team that is captured by the CEO.
CPS = Total compensation of CEO / total compensation of top five executives

An executive’s total compensation is the sum of salary, bonuses and other cash
compensation. This compensation does not include long-term incentives such as stock
options and restricted stocks, because these are rarely exercised in China4.

Firm performance
Our measures of firm performance are return on assets (ROA), firm value (Tobin’s Q),
stock returns (RET) and return on sales (ROS), defined respectively as the ratio of net income
to the book value of total assets, the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and the book
value of debt to total assets, firm annual stock returns and the ratio of net income to total
3

China’s listed firms only disclosed a small portion of individual CEO pay until 2005.
The stock option and another component of CEO compensation, perks, will be discussed in the additional tests later in this
paper.

4
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sales.
We also include CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO duality, firm size, board size, board
composition, leverage, largest shareholder ownership and future investment opportunity as
control variables. Appendix A.1 provides definitions for all variables.

4. Results
4.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our sample, including all the variables we use for
both univariate and multivariate tests. The results show that the mean (median) of CEO pay is
448,546 (302,200) RMB, which is about five times the average CEO pay of 85,000 (60,000)
RMB reported by Firth et al. (2007) for the period between 1998 and 2000. Actually, the
CEO pay increased almost five times between 2005 and 2010. The average CEO pay slice is
31.88%, which indicates that total CEO compensation accounts for almost one-third of total
compensation of the top five paid executives. This figure is close, although it’s still lower
than the 35.70% reported for U.S. executives by Bebchuk et al. (2011). Additionally, the
board size averages 9.31 in China, with 3.32 serving as independent directors. The average
proportion of independent directors is 35.66%, which satisfies the requirements of the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRS) that independent directors must account for at
least one-third of the total numbers on boards for all listed firms. In the table's last panel, we
show the distribution of the firms. In our sample in particular there are 834 firm-year
observations of politically connected SOEs, and 825 politically connected private firms.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variables
Panel A: Executive compensation
CEO pay
Total of top five executives' pay
Panel B: CEO pay dispersion
Pay gap
CEO pay slice (CPS) %
Panel C: Firm performance
ROA (%)
Tobin’s Q
RET (%)
ROS (%)
Panel D: CEO characteristics
CEO age
CEO tenure

Mean

Median

Lower quartile

Higher quartile

448,546
1,837,765

302,200
1,296,050

170,000
760,000

515,000
2,150,000

250,868
31.88

120,050
28.18

58,100
24.00

245,000
35.58

3.38
1.77
55.97
7.21

3.63
1.42
26.75
5.80

1.34
1.08
-25.65
2.07

6.49
1.98
114.42
12.57

46.67
3.07

46
2.5

42
1

51
4.5

12

CEO duality
0.16
0
New CEO
0.17
0
Retiring CEO
0.04
0
Inside CEO
0.72
1
Number of executives (Novp)
6.69
6
Panel D: Firm characteristics and corporate governance
Firm size (millions)
2,780
2,000
Leverage
48.26
49.33
Board size
9.31
9
Independent directors
3.32
3
Largest (%)
37.77
36
Managerial ownership (%)
0.0585
0.0329
Panel E: firm type distributions
SOEs
PC
Non-PC
Observations
834
3943

0
0
0
0
5

0
0
0
1
8

1,010
33.53
9
3
25.22
0.00875

4,460
62.87
10
4
49.55
0.1413

PC
825

Private firms
Non-PC
2579

Pay gap is defined as the difference in compensation between the CEO and the median level of other executives.
All the other variables are defined in Appendix A.1. All the value variables are in terms of China’s currency, the
RMB.

4.2 Ownership structure, CEO pay dispersion and firm performance
4.2.1 CEO pay dispersion and firm performance
To provide some primary evidence to support our hypotheses we conduct the following
regression to examine whether tournament theory applies in China, reflected by a positive
relation between CEO pay dispersion and firm performance:
PERFit = β 0 + β1 PayDispersionit + β 2 Sizeit + β 3 Leverageit
+ β 4 Largest it + β 5 Board it + β 6 Indepit + ε it

(1)

where PERF is firm performance. We use four measures as the proxies for firm performance:
return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q), stock returns (RET) and return on sales (ROS).
PayDispersion is CEO pay dispersion, measured by the GAP and CPS in each regression,
respectively. Size is the log of the firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total
assets. Largest is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder. Board is the log of
the numbers of directors on the board. Indep is the proportion of independent directors.
Table 2 presents the results of the relationship between CEO pay dispersion and firm
performance. Two measures for CEO pay dispersion are applied in the regression: GAP and
CPS. As shown in Table 2, the coefficients on CEO pay dispersion are all estimated to be
positive and statistically significant (except when stock returns are used as the measurement
of firm performance), which indicates that the pay differential effectively provides internal
13

incentives for executives to deliver good firm performance;

this is consistent with the

prediction of tournament theory. Among the control variables, we find coefficients that are
consistent with those reported in previous studies (Chen et al., 2009). On one hand,
accounting performance (ROA and ROS) is positively related to firm size and largest
shareholder ownership, but negatively related to firm leverage level. On the other hand, firm
value (Tobin’s Q) is negatively related to firm size and largest shareholder ownership. In
addition, the results show that across these four specifications the independent directors most
significantly affect firm value rather than firm accounting or market performance. These
results are in line with the fact that with China's poor corporate governance system and
inadequate outside investor protection, shareholders of publicly held firms feel unsure of
external mechanisms, and therefore place more emphasis on managerial compensation
because it is believed to be the most effective internal mechanism available (Murphy, 1999;
Firth et al., 2006b).

Table 2. Regression of pay-dispersion effect on firm performance
Panel A: GAP is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement
Dependent variable ROA
Q
Constant
-0.20***(-8.52)
5.63***(13.86)
GAP
0.09***(10.41)
0.12***(8.20)
Size
0.09***(7.78)
-0.21***(-8.97)
Leverage
-0.15***(-19.23) -0.64***(-3.07)
Largest
0.05***(7.01)
-0.07***(-6.05)
Board
0.03(0.58)
-0.17*(-1.92)
Indep
-0.01(-0.50)
1.16***(3.30)
Year fixed effect
Included
Included
Industry fixed effect Included
Included
Area fixed effect
Included
Included
Adj R2
0.23
0.10
Obs
7811
7811
Panel B: CPS is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement
Dependent variable ROA
Q
Constant
-0.15***(-6.36)
5.82***(14.85)
CPS
0.05**(2.44)
0.02**(2.16)
Size
0.02***(10.43)
-0.16***(-7.72)
Leverage
-0.16***(-19.09) -0.70***(-3.48)
Largest
0.04***(5.69)
-0.08***(-7.42)
Board
0.03(0.63)
-0.18**(-2.02)
Indep
-0.05(-0.26)
1.26***(3.72)
Year fixed effect
Included
Included
Industry fixed effect Included
Included
Area fixed effect
Included
Included
Adj R2
0.20
0.10
Obs
7811
7811
14

RET
0.16(0.65)
0.01(1.22)
0.03**(2.35)
0.06(1.02)
-0.03***(-4.67)
-0.03(-0.60)
-0.30(-1.34)
Included
Included
Included
0.03
7811

ROS
-0.52***(-8.84)
0.05***(8.76)
0.03***(9.23)
-0.32***(-18.94)
0.08***(4.73)
-0.04(-0.34)
-0.02(-0.40)
Included
Included
Included
0.19
7811

RET
0.55***(2.71)
0.02(1.32)
0.02(1.30)
0.08(1.23)
-0.03***(-3.81)
-0.05(-0.87)
-0.31(-1.52)
Included
Included
Included
0.03
7811

ROS
-0.53***(-9.08)
0.12**(2.47)
0.04***(12.74)
-0.34***(-20.62)
0.04***(2.67)
0.02(0.02)
-0.02(-0.26)
Included
Included
Included
0.19
7811

The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay
dispersion is measured by either GAP or CPS. Size is the log of a firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total
debts to total assets. Largest is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. Board is the log of the
total number of directors on a firm's board. Indep is the proportion of independent directors on a firm's board.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error,
clustered by firm.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

4.2.2 Ownership structure and relation between pay dispersion and firm performance
In this section we analyze whether tournament incentives differ across the ownership
structure by dividing our total sample into SOEs and private firms. A firm is identified as an
SOE if the government is the controlling shareholder. To take a primary look at the effect of
pay dispersion on firm performance, and the effect of ownership structure on tournament
incentives, we conduct multivariate analysis to test our hypotheses and provide evidence for
the association between CEO pay dispersion and firm performance between SOEs and private
firms. To do so, we run the following regression:
PERFit = β 0 + β1 PayDispersionit + β 2 PayDispersionit * Stateit + β 3 Stateit + β 4 Sizeit
+ β 5 Leverageit + β 6 Largest it + β 7 Board it + β 8 Indepit + ε it

(2)

where PERF is firm performance, measured as return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q), stock
returns (RET) and return on sales (ROS) in each specification. State is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm is ultimately controlled by the government. All the other variables are
defined the same as those in Equation (1). The results of this regression are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Regression of pay-dispersion effect on firm performance between SOEs and
private firms
Panel A: GAP is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement
Dependent variable
ROA
Q
Constant
-0.49***(-7.05)
5.01***(6.31)
GAP
0.08***(5.20)
0.15***(8.22)
GAP*State
-0.03***(-2.71)
-0.03**(-2.45)
State
0.03(1.62)
0.35(1.35)
Size
0.03***(3.97)
-0.20***(-6.38)
Leverage
-0.39***(-2.86)
-0.61***(-3.77)
Largest
0.03***(3.36)
-0.69***(-8.15)
Board
0.02**(2.58)
-0.17***(-2.65)
Indep
-0.04(-1.49)
1.01***(3.82)
Year fixed effect
Included
Included
Industry fixed effect Included
Included
Area fixed effect
Included
Included
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RET
0.81***(2.98)
0.09(0.55)
-0.08(-0.45)
0.05(0.19)
0.09(0.90)
0.06(1.04)
-0.33***(-4.23)
-0.07(-1.45)
-0.37*(-1.85)
Included
Included
Included

ROS
-0.59***(-5.74)
0.05***(5.46)
-0.01**(-2.29)
0.09***(2.99)
0.03***(3.27)
-0.32***(-7.57)
0.08***(7.87)
0.02(1.41)
-0.03(-0.82)
Included
Included
Included

0.42
0.15
Adj R2
Obs
7811
7811
Panel B: CPS is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement
Dependent variable
ROA
Q
Constant
-0.18***(-7.46)
5.65***(4.55)
CPS
0.07**(2.01)
0.12***(2.79)
CPS*State
-0.02**(-2.11)
-0.07**(-2.45)
State
0.02(0.47)
0.05(0.87)
Size
0.02***(3.19)
-0.15***(-7.61)
Leverage
-0.16***(-8.68)
-0.69***(-3.44)
Largest
0.05***(7.00)
-0.81***(-7.00)
Board
0.01*(1.80)
-0.15(-1.61)
Indep
-0.02(-0.42)
1.24***(3.63)
Year fixed effect
Included
Included
Industry fixed effect Included
Included
Area fixed effect
Included
Included
Adj R2
0.23
0.10
Obs
7811
7811

0.03
7811

0.20
7811

RET
0.76***(3.46)
0.15(0.61)
-0.03(-0.12)
0.05(0.49)
0.08(0.85)
0.06(1.01)
-0.32***(-4.19)
-0.07(-1.49)
-0.34*(-1.65)
Included
Included
Included
0.03
7811

ROS
-0.57***(-9.90)
0.08***(2.77)
-0.05**(-2.18)
0.04***(5.03)
0.03***(3.57)
-0.32***(-9.94)
0.06***(3.93)
0.01(0.77)
-0.02(-0.35)
Included
Included
Included
0.19
7811

The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay
dispersion is measured by either GAP or CPS. State is a dummy variable coded 1 for state-controlled firms and
0 for private firms. Size is the log of a firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debts to total assets.
Largest is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. Board is the log of the total number of
directors on a firm's board. Indep is the proportion of independent directors on a firm's board.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error,
clustered by firm.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 3 reports our findings on the effects of pay dispersion on firm performance across
different ownership structures. We use four measurements – ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns,
and ROS – as proxies for firm performance. Panel A in the table presents the results using
GAP as a measure of pay dispersion, while Panel B uses the CPS. With ROA, Tobin’s Q and
ROS as measures of firm performance, the coefficients on both pay dispersion measures are
positive and significant. This result is consistent when industry-adjusted ROA, Tobin’s Q and
ROS are used. This indicates that a large pay gap between the CEO and other top executives
can provide incentives for the executives to work hard and deliver good firm performance.
This result is consistent with our hypothesis that a large CEO pay dispersion can increase
firm performance. However, we are more concerned about the results of the interaction terms
between pay dispersion and State, since these interaction terms are used to test whether state
ownership is associated with a weaker relationship between pay dispersion and firm
performance. The results in Table 3 show that the coefficients of these interaction terms are
negative and statistically significant, except when stock returns are used as firm performance.
This result suggests that CEO pay dispersion has a positive effect on firm performance in
private firms, but that this effect becomes less positive in state-controlled firms. These results
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are in line with our second hypothesis.
As discussed above, we believe that the weaker relationship between CEO pay dispersion
and firm performance in SOEs is attributed to the multiple objectives of the state shareholders.
However, we have not addressed whether it means that tournament incentives have become
inefficient in SOEs in China. To answer this question, we choose the SOE sub-sample to
examine the effectiveness of tournament incentives alongside other objectives. Recently
Bradshaw et al. (2012) have argued that in SOEs, taxes are a dividend to the state controlling
shareholder, but a cost to other shareholders. One of the important political objectives of
bureaucrats is to collect higher taxes. If managers of SOEs make tax decisions that are
favorable to the government, they are more likely to be promoted in the Chinese bureaucratic
hierarchy. Bradshaw et al. (2012) find that SOEs have significantly higher tax rates than nonSOEs, and that the tax rates are negatively associated with stock returns. Following this work,
we select the tax-payment rates of the SOEs as a proxy for measuring political objectives
other than economic performance. Empirically, we rerun Equation (2) by replacing State
dummy with tax payments (using the ratio of the tax payment to total assets as the proxy),
and use the SOE sub-sample only. The results are reported in Table 4 below. For the sake of
brevity we report only the coefficients of the key variables. Panel A and B show the results
using GAP and CPS, respectively, as the measures of CEO pay dispersion, revealing that
CEO pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance. The interaction terms between
tax payments and CEO pay dispersion are of concern, because the estimated coefficients on
interaction terms are generally all negative and statistically significant (except where stock
return is used as a dependent variable). This result shows that in SOEs, CEO pay dispersion is
less related to firm performance when firms pay higher taxes, indicating that tournament
incentives are less effective in SOEs with multiple objectives. Moreover, when the combined
effects of both CEO pay dispersion and its interaction with tax payments are calculated, the
net results are still positive, indicating that tournament incentives still work in SOEs with
multiple objectives, but have a weaker effect.

Table 4. Tournament incentives and tax payments in SOEs
Panel A: Subsample of SOEs
Dependent variable
ROA

Q
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RET

ROS

GAP
0.12***(5.42)
0.16***(7.15)
0.05(0.86)
0.23***(6.29)
Tax
0.07***(2.59)
0.06**(2.08)
0.07(0.50)
0.02***(3.47)
GAP*Tax
-0.06***(-2.77)
-0.05**(-2.02)
-0.02(-1.00)
-0.02***(-3.33)
Other control variables include firm size, leverage, board size, independent directors, largest ownership,
year, industry and area fixed effects
Adj R2
0.49
0.10
0.05
0.17
Obs
4777
4777
4777
4777
Panel B: Subsample of SOEs
Dependent variable
ROA
Q
RET
ROS
CPS
0.03***(2.73)
0.72***(2.77)
-0.32(-0.93)
0.15**(2.34)
Tax
0.06(0.29)
0.05*(1.75)
-0.02(-1.00)
0.05**(2.37)
CPS*Tax
-0.02**(-2.45)
-0.06(-1.55)
0.02(0.95)
-0.01**(-2.33)
Other control variables include firm size, leverage, board size, independent directors, largest ownership,
year, industry and area fixed effects
Adj R2
0.71
0.10
0.07
0.20
Obs
4777
4777
4777
4777
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay
dispersion is measured by either GAP or CPS. Tax is the ratio of the amount of taxes payouts to total assets. All
the other variables are defined as those in the previous tables.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error,
clustered by firm.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

4.3 Political connection, CEO pay dispersion and firm performance
This section examines the effect of CEO political connection on the effectiveness of
tournament incentives. The definition of CEO political connection is consistent with that of
Fan et al. (2007): a CEO is defined as politically connected if the CEO was or is a
government official or military official, including the member of the National People’s
Congress (NPC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) or the AllChina Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), or an official of other ministries of the
government or military. We are also interested in examining whether this effect varies
according to the ownership structure. The main empirical model we estimate is as follows:

PERFit = β 0 + β1 PayDispersionit + β 2 PayDispersionit * PCit + β 3 PCit + β 4 Sizeit

(3)

+ β 5 Leverageit + β 6 Largestit + β 7 Board it + β 8 Indepit + ε it
where PC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise.
All the other variables are defined as in Equation (2). The results of this regression are
reported in Table 5.

Table 5. Regression results of PC and pay-dispersion effects on firm performance for
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full sample
Panel A: GAP is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement
Dependent variable
ROA
Q
RET
Constant
-0.21***(-9.12)
5.27***(3.48)
0.68***(3.26)
GAP
0.07***(5.58)
0.12***(8.38)
0.09(1.03)
GAP*PC
-0.03**(-2.35)
-0.02**(-2.06)
-0.02(-0.32)
PC
0.02(0.28)
0.03(0.34)
0.17(0.34)
Size
0.07***(7.11)
-0.20***(-9.32) 0.02(1.53)
Leverage
-0.15***(-8.61)
-0.62***(-3.27) 0.07(1.06)
Largest
0.05***(8.13)
-0.70***(-6.17) -0.31***(-4.17)
Board
0.05(1.13)
-0.18**(-2.01)
-0.05(-1.06)
Indep
-0.09(-0.50)
1.01***(2.90)
-0.39*(-1.92)
Year fixed effect
Included
Included
Included
Industry fixed effect Included
Included
Included
Area fixed effect
Included
Included
Included
Adj R2
0.24
0.10
0.03
Obs
7811
7811
7811
Panel B: CPS is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement
Dependent variable
ROA
Q
RET
Constant
-0.15***(-6.45)
5.81***(4.75)
0.67***(3.17)
CPS
0.09**(2.26)
0.10**(2.00)
0.18(1.09)
CPS*PC
-0.02**(-2.28)
-0.06**(-2.37)
-0.12(-0.25)
PC
0.03(0.76)
0.03(0.39)
0.03(0.17)
Size
0.02***(4.28)
-0.16***(-7.75)
0.02(1.31)
Leverage
-0.16***(-3.00)
-0.70***(-3.48)
0.06(1.04)
Largest
0.04***(5.99)
-0.85***(-7.28)
-0.30***(-4.10)
Board
0.04(0.76)
-0.18**(-2.00)
-0.05(-1.14)
Indep
-0.03(-0.19)
1.26***(3.73)
-0.35*(-1.72)
Year fixed effect
Included
Included
Included
Industry fixed effect Included
Included
Included
Area fixed effect
Included
Included
Included
Adj R2
0.21
0.10
0.03
Obs
7811
7811
7811

ROS
-0.60***(-3.31)
0.06***(8.22)
-0.03***(-2.58)
0.05(0.45)
0.03**(3.58)
-0.32**(-2.17)
0.07***(4.43)
0.03(0.26)
-0.02(-0.48)
Included
Included
Included
0.20
7811
ROS
-0.52***(-9.13)
0.04**(2.55)
-0.01**(-2.19)
0.02(1.35)
0.03***(2.64)
-0.34***(-2.80)
0.05***(3.21)
0.02(0.02)
-0.01(-0.23)
Included
Included
Included
0.19
7811

Firm performance is a dependent variable measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay dispersion
is measured by either GAP or CPS. PC is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0
otherwise. Size is the log of a firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debts to total assets. Largest is the
proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. Tenure is the log of years that a CEO has been in that
position. Age is the log of CEO age. Board is the log of the total number of directors on the boards. Indep is the
proportion of independent directors on the boards.
The T-statistics are in parentheses and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard
error, clustered by firm.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 5 shows that CEO pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance. Here we
focus on the coefficients of the interaction terms between PC and CEO pay dispersion.
Across all specifications, the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between CEO pay
dispersion and PC are negative and statistically significant (except when stock returns are
used as the firm performance). Specifically, in column 1 of Panel A, the estimated coefficient
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of the interaction term is -0.03 with 5% significance (t-value is -2.35); this indicates that the
positive effect of CEO pay dispersion on firm performance becomes weaker when the CEO is
politically connected, which is consistent with our third hypothesis. In addition, the estimated
coefficients of PC are positive and only statistically significant when GAP is used as the
measure of CEO pay dispersion (Panel A)5. This also suggests that executives could build
political connections with the government and "win the contest" without exerting more effort
than other executives, thus making tournament incentives weaker. In addition, when a CEO is
politically connected, other executives lower in the hierarchy find it more difficult to compete,
which makes tournament incentives less attractive.
Furthermore, we divided our sample into two sub-samples that only include SOEs and
private firms, respectively, and rerun our Equation (3). From the untabulated results, we find
that the negative effect of political connection on the relationship between pay dispersion and
firm performance is only significant in privately controlled firms, which supports our third
hypothesis. Existing studies that examine the effect of CEO political connection in private
firms in China argue that SOEs are ultimately controlled by the government, which naturally
leads to features such as political connections (Li et al., 2008), and therefore the effect of
politically connected executives will be offset by state ownership. Our results echo that the
effect of CEO political connection is more significant in private firms, where the positive
association between CEO pay dispersion and firm performance weakens significantly.

4.4 Reform of split-share structure, pay dispersion and firm performance
In 2005 a split-share structure reform was launched on the Chinese stock market to
transform shares that were non-tradable on the stock exchanges into tradable. This reform
started in April 2005 and finished at the end of 20076. Before 2005, Chinese stock exchanges
were characterized by a split-share structure, where most of the listed firms were either
5

This result indicates that firms with politically connected CEOs may outperform firms with non-politically connected
CEOs. Our results differ from Fan et al. (2007), possibly because they used a sample of newly privatized SOEs from 1993
to 2001, while our sample includes both SOEs and private firms and ranges from 2005 to 2010. On the other hand, Fan et al.
(2007) focus on the stock-market reaction after listing, while we use the returns and firm value as proxies for firm
performance.
6
At the end of 2007, almost all listed firms in China complied with the split-share structure reform, and such firms now
represent 98% of the total market capitalization.
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directly or indirectly controlled by the government, and the shares held by the government’s
controlling shareholders were non-tradable (these accounted for almost two-thirds of the total
shares outstanding7). Holders of non-tradable shares were less likely to benefit from share
trading on the stock market, and thus tended to focus on accounting performance rather than
market performance; this was not necessarily consistent with the interests of minority
shareholders. Moreover, the controlling shareholders extracted private benefits by setting
operational objectives that were not conducive to the wealth of minority shareholders, but
only their own private interests (Cao et al., 2011a).
However, after the split-share structure reform, all common shares outstanding circulated
on the stock market, and the interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders
became aligned to some extent (Li et al., 2011). In other words, all types of shareholders
could now benefit from improving stock market performance. Thus, evaluations of firm
performance become more market-oriented and measurable, and stock returns become
increasingly important. On this basis, therefore, we conjecture that listed firms began to
transfer the interest on accounting performance to stock returns, and indeed may have reacted
actively to stock returns after the split-share structure reform. However, since a complicated
agency problem still exists in the SOEs due to their multiple social responsibilities in addition
to their obligations to maximize shareholders’ value, we expect that the positive effect of
share reform will be greater in private firms than in SOEs.
To examine the effect of split-share structure reform on the relationship between CEO pay
dispersion and firm performance, we conduct multivariate tests. Explicitly, we identify the
completion time of the reform for each firm as the benchmark to divide our total sample into
before- and after-reform sub-samples.
In particular, we apply a regression analysis and rerun Equation (2) by adding the dummy
variable Reform, which is equal to 1 for the post-reform period and 0 otherwise, and interact
it with CEO pay dispersion. The estimated results, reported in Table 6, provide some
evidence to support our hypotheses. In general, the coefficients on two CEO pay-dispersion
measures are positive and statistically significant, which supports our first hypothesis,
7

These non-tradable shares can only be transferred after approval by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
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whereas the negative coefficients on the interaction terms between CEO pay dispersion and
state ownership indicate that tournament incentives are weaker in SOEs, supporting our
second hypothesis. Some interesting evidence has emerged regarding the effects of the reform,
particularly in Panel A, where the CEO pay gap is used as CEO pay dispersion, and the
estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between CEO pay dispersion and the Reform
dummy are positive and significant when Tobin’s Q and stock returns are used as proxies for
firm performance. This indicates that since the market development, the positive association
between CEO pay dispersion and firm performance has been strengthened; this is consistent
with our fourth hypothesis. Moreover, the negative coefficients on GAP*State*Reform are
consistent with our hypothesis that the positive effect of the reform on the relationship
between CEO pay dispersion and firm performance is stronger in private firms than in SOEs;
this result holds both before and after the market reform. Overall, the general results in Table
6 suggest that the effect of tournament incentives on firm performance has been enhanced by
the market development, but the amplification is still weaker in SOEs relative to private firms.
The results also suggest that executive pay dispersion starts to show a positive effect on stock
returns after the reform, but not before.
Furthermore, we try to treat the split-share structure reform as a policy variable that can
provide an exogenous source of variation in explanatory variables. We revise the sample used
in Table 6 and rerun the equation based on a new sample that includes the period from the
first year of the reform to the year of its completion. This reduced the sample size from the
original 7,811 firm-year observations to 3,573. These untabulated results are broadly similar
to those reported in Table 6; this, again, provides supports to our hypotheses after controlling
for the endogeneity issue.

Table 6. Effect of reform on the relationship between pay dispersion and firm
performance
Panel A: GAP is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement
Dependent variable
ROA
Q
Constant
-0.23***(-7.94)
5.05***(8.64)
GAP
0.06***(5.86)
0.15***(6.12)
State
0.03(1.06)
0.45(1.26)
Reform
0.03*(1.90)
1.16***(5.38)
GAP*State
-0.02**(-2.27)
-0.03**(-2.10)
GAP*Reform
0.02(1.37)
0.06***(3.29)
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RET
-0.13(-0.53)
0.07(1.18)
0.10***(2.87)
1.73***(8.46)
-0.03(-0.17)
0.12***(7.21)

ROS
-0.61***(-8.97)
0.07***(3.42)
0.10**(2.11)
0.03(0.73)
-0.02***(-2.78)
0.01**(2.36)

GAP*State*Reform -0.01**(-1.96)
-0.03***(-2.74)
Size
0.02***(7.98)
-0.23***(-9.50)
Leverage
-0.15***(-8.23)
-0.50***(-2.87)
Largest
0.06***(8.67)
-0.66***(-5.80)
Board
0.02*(1.87)
-0.09(-0.92)
Indep
-0.01(-0.63)
0.69**(1.99)
Year fixed effect
Included
Included
Industry fixed effect Included
Included
Area fixed effect
Included
Included
0.25
0.15
Adj R2
Obs
7811
7811
Panel B: CPS is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement
Dependent variable
ROA
Q
Constant
-0.17***(-7.25)
6.05***(9.55)
CPS
0.06***(2.86)
0.07**(2.05)
State
0.02(1.15)
0.02(0.18)
Reform
0.03(0.98)
0.43***(8.72)
CPS*State
-0.02**(-2.37)
-0.03**(-2.24)
CPS*Reform
0.02*(1.91)
0.18(1.15)
CPS*State*Reform -0.01***(-2.78)
-0.01**(-2.06)
Size
0.02***(10.85)
-0.19***(-9.45)
Leverage
-0.16***(-8.43)
-0.56***(-3.11)
Largest
0.05***(7.02)
-0.75***(-6.49)
Board
0.02*(1.85)
-0.05(-0.58)
Indep
-0.01(-0.45)
0.92***(2.74)
Year fixed effect
Included
Included
Industry fixed effect Included
Included
Area fixed effect
Included
Included
Adj R2
0.23
0.13
Obs
7811
7811

-0.03***(2.95)
-0.02(-0.20)
0.12*(1.80)
-0.28***(-3.65)
-0.03(-0.67)
-0.57***(-2.73)
Included
Included
Included
0.02
7811

-0.02**(-2.01)
0.03***(9.16)
-0.32***(-9.17)
0.08***(4.78)
0.01(0.89)
-0.03(-0.56)
Included
Included
Included
0.20
7811

RET
0.97***(4.28)
0.19(0.86)
0.06*(1.71)
0.19**(2.24)
-0.03(-0.27)
0.09**(2.33)
-0.10***(-2.68)
-0.01(-1.18)
0.10(1.56)
-0.27***(-3.43)
-0.03(-0.65)
-0.53**(-2.55)
Included
Included
Included
0.05
7811

ROS
-0.56***(-9.60)
0.05***(2.62)
0.05(1.60)
0.01(1.18)
-0.02***(-2.74)
0.05*(1.81)
-0.01**(-2.42)
0.04***(13.13)
-0.32***(-9.59)
0.06***(3.93)
0.02(0.82)
-0.02(-0.39)
Included
Included
Included
0.20
7811

Firm performance is a dependent variable measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay dispersion
is measured by either GAP or CPS. State is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has the government as the
controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise. Reform is a dummy variable coded 1 for post reform period and 0
otherwise. Size is the log of a firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debts to total assets. Largest is the
proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. Board is the log of the total number of directors on the
boards. Indep is the proportion of independent directors on the boards.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error,
clustered by firm.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

5. Robustness tests
5.1. Endogeneity
Murphy (1999) and Firth et al. (2007) argue that it is effective to make managerial
compensation a function of firm performance to solve the agency problems between
managers and shareholders. Moreover, Palia (2001) suggests that managerial compensation
and firm performance are jointly determined. Since pay dispersion is related to managerial
compensation, we consider it to be endogenously determined. If this is the case, the OLS
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regression analysis will result in biased estimation results. To address the issue of
endogeneity and examine whether our results are robust, we follow Kale et al. (2009) in
applying a two-stage least square (2SLS) 8 . In the first stage we regress the CEO pay
dispersion against a set of control variables and instrumental variables, as per the discussion
in Kale et al. (2009) 9 . In the second stage we replace the CEO pay dispersion with the
predicted value obtained from the first stage in our main regression. We report the results
from the second stage in Table 7.

Table 7 presents the results from the second stage of Equation (2) using the 2SLS method
of estimation. Panel A uses GAP as a measure of pay dispersion and Panel B uses CPS. We
mainly focus on the coefficients of pay dispersion and the interaction terms between pay
dispersion and the State dummy. The results of the regression show significantly positive
coefficients on all pay-dispersion measurements (except the RET regression), and
significantly negative coefficients on interaction terms across four specifications. The general
results from Table 7 are broadly similar to those in Table 3. Again, these results indicate that
pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance, and that this positive relationship is
weaker in firms where the controlling shareholder is the state. We also apply the 2SLS to
estimate all the other equations and get similar results to those reported in Table 3 to 6. For
the sake of brevity, we do not report these results in this paper.

Table 7. 2SLS estimation of pay dispersion on firm performance (second stage)
Panel A: GAP is used as pay dispersion
Dependent variable
ROA
Constant
-0.19**(-2.01)
GAP
0.09***(2.85)
GAP*State
-0.02***(-2.62)
State
0.09(1.62)
Size
0.08***(9.45)
Leverage
-0.12***(-2.80)
Largest
0.04***(6.09)
Board
0.02(0.67)
Indep
-0.02(-1.42)
Year fixed effect
Included

Q
4.86***(3.15)
0.12***(8.12)
-0.07**(-2.45)
0.02(0.56)
-0.17***(-9.32)
-0.91***(-7.42)
-0.75***(-6.64)
-0.15*(-1.64)
1.08***(3.20)
Included

8

RET
-0.01(-0.07)
0.22(0.07)
-0.02(-1.63)
0.02*(1.72)
0.02***(3.26)
0.12***(4.88)
-0.02(-0.64)
-0.02(-0.91)
-0.03(-0.04)
Included

ROS
-0.68***(-4.33)
0.15***(7.25)
-0.03**(-2.49)
0.02***(3.72)
0.05**(2.15)
-0.32***(-9.48)
0.06***(3.41)
0.02(0.47)
-0.04(-0.89)
Included

As for selecting the instrumental variables, we follow Kale et al. (2009) and choose industry firm median pay dispersion.
Other control variables include CEO tenure, CEO age, CEO duality, New CEO dummy, Insider CEO dummy, Retired CEO
dummy, number of executives in the top management team, number of directors, ratio of independent directors to total
number of directors, managerial ownership and volatility of stock returns. These variables are defined in Appendix A.1.

9
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Industry fixed effect Included
Area fixed effect
Included
Adj R2
0.25
Obs
7811
Panel B: CPS is used as firm performance
Dependent variable
ROA
Constant
-0.16***(-8.14)
CPS
0.06**(2.30)
CPS*State
-0.03***(-2.88)
State
0.02(0.76)
Size
0.02***(3.07)
Leverage
-0.14**(-2.25)
Largest
0.03***(4.38)
Board
0.03(0.72)
Indep
-0.02(-1.23)
Year fixed effect
Included
Industry fixed effect Included
Area fixed effect
Included
Adj R2
0.22
Obs
7811

Included
Included
0.12
7811

Included
Included
0.03
7811

Included
Included
0.21
7811

Q
5.36***(4.77)
0.10**(2.10)
-0.05**(-2.40)
0.07*(1.88)
-0.15***(-7.44)
-0.99***(-8.04)
-0.85***(-7.40)
-0.15(-1.56)
1.15***(3.36)
Included
Included
Included
0.10
7811

RET
-0.04(-0.32)
0.18(0.33)
-0.02(-0.39)
0.01(0.92)
0.02**(2.11)
0.15***(5.81)
-0.02(-0.46)
-0.03(-1.20)
-0.03(-0.28)
Included
Included
Included
0.02
7811

ROS
-0.63***(-9.55)
0.06***(2.90)
-0.02**(-2.21)
0.03***(4.83)
0.04**(4.25)
-0.34***(-3.02)
0.05**(2.46)
0.01(0.45)
-0.03(-0.67)
Included
Included
Included
0.20
7811

Firm performance is a dependent variable measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, RET and ROS. Pay dispersion is
measured by either GAP or CPS. State is a dummy variable coded 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise.
Size is the log of firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debts to total assets. Largest is the proportion of
shares held by the largest shareholders. Board is the log of the total number of directors on the boards. Indep is
the proportion of independent directors on the boards.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error,
clustered by firms,
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

5.2. Other robustness tests
5.2.1 Agency problems in family-controlled firms
The first concern may be related to the application of tournament theory for those firms
with agency issues between controlling and minority shareholders. Existing literature
suggests that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the controlling
shareholders reflects the expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002;
Lemmon and Lin, 2003). Therefore, we create a new variable, Wedge, defined as the
difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholders; this
variable aims to capture the dominance of the agency problem between controlling and
minority shareholders. Empirically, we rerun our Equation (2), replacing the State dummy
with Wedge and using only the sub-sample of private firms. In the unreported results we find
that the CEO pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance, and the coefficients of
Wedge and the interaction terms between Wedge and CEO pay dispersion are both negative
but insignificant. These results indicate that the tournament theory still applies without
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significant change in private firms when we control for the agency problem between
controlling and minority shareholders. One possible explanation is that some of China’s
private firms are carved out from the former state-owned firms, and the ultimate controlling
shareholders are usually several private entities. While the agency problem between the
largest shareholders and other shareholders is not as severe as if the ultimate controller is an
individual or a family, the agency problem between shareholders and managers still exists,
since those private firms need to select managers to operate them. Therefore, the tournament
incentive is generally still relevant in these private firms.
Now the question is whether tournament theory will also be relevant to family controlled
firms where the CEO is also a member of the same family of shareholders, which would
mitigate the agency problems between shareholders and managers. We expect that the owner
CEO in family controlled firms will substitute for the tournament and reduce the
effectiveness of tournament incentives. To test the effectiveness of tournament theory, we
identify family controlled firms where CEO is the member of the family controlling
shareholders, and create a new dummy variable Owner_CEO, which is equal to 1 for these
firms. Empirically, we rerun our Equation (2) by replacing the State dummy with the
Owner_CEO dummy, using only the sub-sample of private firms.
The results are reported in Table 8. The regression results show that the coefficients on
CEO pay dispersion are all positive and statistically significant (the only marginal
significance relates to stock returns), indicating the application of tournament theory. The
interaction terms between the CEO pay dispersion and Owner_CEO provide some interesting
evidence. Across these specifications, the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative
and significant, indicating that tournament incentives are weaker in firms where the CEO is
also from the same family and is the ultimate controlling shareholder of the firm. These
results suggest that in family-controlled firms where CEOs come from family shareholders,
the owner-CEOs have more incentive to maximize firm value and less need to receive
additional incentives through compensation from the firms; this is consistent with the
prediction for the family-control incentive alignment hypothesis (McConaughy, 2000), and
findings that family CEOs are unlikely to act against the interests of the company (Amoako26

Adu et al., 2011).

Table 8. Tournament incentives and family-controlled firms
Panel A:GAP is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement
Dependent variable ROA
Q
RET
ROS
GAP
0.06***(3.06)
0.19***(3.36)
0.03(1.62)
0.03***(2.84)
Owner_CEO
-0.03(-1.26)
0.72(1.08)
1.03***(3.31)
-0.13***(-2.62)
GAP*Owner_CEO
-0.01(-0.40)
-0.06***(-3.90)
-0.06**(-2.34) -0.01**(-2.17)
Other control variables include firm size, leverage, board size, independent directors, largest ownership,
year, industry and area fixed effects
Adj R2
0.20
0.08
0.03
0.18
Obs
3034
3034
3034
3034
Panel B: CPS is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement
Dependent variable ROA
Q
RET
ROS
CPS
0.02**(2.01)
0.22**(2.49)
0.27(1.32)
0.05**(2.42)
Owner_CEO
-0.01(-1.48)
0.18(1.41)
0.42***(5.96)
-0.02*(-1.84)
CPS*Owner_CEO
-0.03**(-2.45)
-0.24***(-3.53)
-0.33(-1.55)
-0.02**(-2.45)
Other control variables include firm size, leverage, board size, independent directors, largest ownership,
year, industry and area fixed effects
Adj R2
0.20
0.10
0.03
0.18
Obs
3034
3034
3034
3034
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay
dispersion is measured by either GAP or CPS. Owner_CEO is a dummy variable equal to 1 for family controlled
firms where the CEO is also the control family member. All the other variables are defined as in the previous
tables.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error,
clustered by firm.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

5.2.2 Other components of CEO compensation
The second concern may be related to the absence of stock options and perks in CEO
compensation, as only cash components are used to calculate pay dispersion in this paper.
The other major component of CEO compensation is long-term incentives such as stock
options. In our previous empirical analysis we did not consider stock options when
calculating CEO compensation: stock options are rarely granted in China’s listed firms, and
during our sample period there were fewer than 50 firms granting stock options to CEOs.
However, due to data limitations it is impossible to calculate the values of stock options. Thus,
we create the dummy variable Options, which is equal to 1 if stock options are granted for the
specific firm-year observation. To see whether our results hold with the consideration of
stock options, we rerun our Equation (2) by replacing the State dummy with the Options
dummy using the full sample. The (unreported) results show that CEO pay dispersion is
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positively related to firm performance. Furthermore, the coefficients of the interaction terms
between CEO pay dispersion and Options are positive and insignificant, indicating that
excluding stock options will not change our main conclusions.
In addition, the literature also suggests that as part of CEO compensation, perks play an
important role in providing incentives for executives in Chinese listed firms (Adithipyangkul
et al., 2011). Following their work, we create the variable Perks, which equals the sum of the
expenditures, including company cars, communications, socializing, meals, travel and
entertainment, disclosed in the footnotes of firms’ cash-flow statements in their annual
reports. Since these expenditures are consumed by all top executives (not just CEOs) for both
work and personal use, perks are not considered to be part of individual CEOs' compensation.
However, our relevant question here is whether the effectiveness of tournament incentives is
mitigated with the consumption of perks. We therefore rerun Equation (2) by replacing the
State dummy with Perks. In the (unreported) results, we find that CEO pay dispersion
continues to affect firm performance positively. More importantly, we find that perks relate to
better firm performance but do not affect tournament incentives, as reflected by an
insignificant coefficient on the interaction term between Perks and CEO pay dispersion. We
further replicate our regression using the SOE sub-sample, obtaining similar results to those
for the full sample. These results suggest that our findings associated with tournament
incentives generally hold after considering other components of CEO compensation,
including options and perks.
Some studies on China have argued that the Chairman is the highest-paid executive, and
is also higher in status than the CEO (Firth et al., 2006b). They argue that the Chairman is the
key person with the responsibility for making critical decisions. To take the situation of
Chairman into account, we apply two alternative proxies for pay dispersion and repeat the
analysis detailed above. These two alternative proxies are the difference between the
Chairman’s compensation and the median compensation of all the other executives, and the
ratio of the Chairman’s compensation to the total compensation of the top five executives.
The general results are broadly similar to those reported from Table 2 to Table 810.
10

When the Chairman’s compensation is applied, some control variables of CEO characteristics, such as CEO age, tenure
and managerial ownership, are replaced with the Chairman’s characteristics.
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We further check the robustness of the positive relationship between pay dispersion and
firm performance by partitioning the entire sample on the basis of industry structure, firm
size and ownership structure. Industry effects may be significant due to regulation and
monopoly, although firms in high-technology industries usually set a higher pay dispersion to
attract and retain their managers (Lee et al., 2008). To examine this we divide the total sample
into high-technology and non-high-technology industries. The results across these two
regressions are similar to those in Table 2.
Murphy (1999) suggests that a firm’s operational complexity plays an important role in
setting managerial compensation and pay dispersion. Since organizational complexity calls
for high-quality managers, it is possible that in complicated firms, pay dispersion may lead to
better firm performance. We proxy for firm complexity by firm size and divide our sample
into quartiles. After examining the impact of pay dispersion on firm performance in the
regression analysis, we find that the effect of pay dispersion is insignificant when firm size is
in the lowest quartile. These results suggest that pay dispersion is more strongly associated
with firm performance in larger firms.
We also test the robustness of our estimation results by using alternative measures of pay
dispersion, including (1) the coefficient of variation in CEO and other executive
compensation; (2) the ratio of CEO pay to the median of other executive compensation; and
(3) the difference between CEO compensation and the second-highest executive
compensation. Our results using these alternatives are qualitatively similar to the reported
results. When we use the alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance to reestimate Equation (2), the result that pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance
is robust. In particular, a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term between
State dummy and pay dispersion suggests that the positive relationship between pay
dispersion and firm performance is weaker in SOEs. This relationship is also consistently
observed when alternative measures are used in the 2SLS estimation. More importantly, the
association between pay dispersion and stock returns becomes significant after the ‘splitshare structure reform which is consistent with our hypothesis.
6. Conclusion
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The issue relating to the pay gap between CEOs and other executives in the top
management team has recently received a considerable amount of attention. An appropriate
pay scheme is essential to the success of SOE reform. Information about executive
compensation in China’s listed firms has been disclosed since 1998, and more completely
since 2005. We have taken advantage of this information to investigate pay dispersion and its
effect on firm performance in China’s listed firms using a sample ranging from 2005 to 2010.
Consistent with tournament theory and previous research (Kale et al., 2009; Chen et al.,
2011a), we find that pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance. We also find
that the positive association between pay dispersion and firm performance is weaker in SOEs
than in privately controlled firms, because SOEs are required to achieve multiple economic
and social goals such as the remittance of tax to governments and alternative incentive
schemes. Moreover, the relationship between pay dispersion and firm performance is
weakened by CEOs' political connections, and we find that this less-positive effect is
significant in private firms. We specifically find that the positive relationship between CEO
pay dispersion and firm performance has been strengthened since the split-share structure
reform, but the positive effect of this reform is weaker in SOEs than in private firms.
Furthermore, we also find that a significantly positive effect of CEO pay dispersion on stock
returns emerged after the split-share structure reform. We provide evidence that state
ownership and political connection exert a value-destroying effect by weakening the positive
effect of tournament incentives, while market reform improves economic efficiency by
strengthening tournament incentives. We argue that in SOEs the satisfaction gained from
multiple economic and social goals, such as the remittance of tax imposed by governments,
has largely reduced the effectiveness of tournament incentives; moreover, in familycontrolled firms where the CEO is also the family owner, the tournament theory does not
hold at all. Overall, our results suggest that in an emerging market, a Chinese firm's
institutional features, such as state ownership and political connections, play important roles
in the effect of tournament incentives on motivating executives.
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Appendix A.1. Definitions of variables
Variable
Panel A: Managerial compensation
CEO compensation (CPAY)
Top executive compensation (TPAY)
Panel B: Pay dispersion
GAP

Definition
Total cash compensation for CEO
Total cash compensation for top five executives

CEO pay slice (CPS)

Log of difference between CEO pay and median of
other executive pay
CPAY/TPAY

Panel C: Firm performance
Return on assets (ROA)
Tobin’s Q
Stock returns (RET)
Return on sales (ROS)

Net income/total assets
Market value/replacement value
Firm annual stock return
Net income/total sales

Panel D: CEO characteristics
CEO age (Age)
CEO tenure (Tenure)
CEO duality (Duality)
New CEO (New)
Retiring CEO (Retire)
Inside CEO (Insider)
Number of executives (Novp)

Log of the age of the CEO
Log of the number of years as the firm’s CEO
Equals 1 if CEO also chairs the board
Equals 1 for first year as CEO
Equals 1 if CEO’s age is more than 62
Equals 1 if CEO is promoted from inside
Log of the number of top executives

Panel E: Firm characteristics and corporate governance
Firm size (Size)
Log of total assets
Board size (Board)
Log of the number of directors on the board
% Independent director (Pond)
Proportion of independent directors on the board
Leverage (Lev)
Total debts/total assets in book value
Investment opportunity (Invest)
Total assets growth ratio
Largest shareholder (Largest)
Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder
Managerial ownership (Mowner)
Percentage of shares owned by the CEO
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